If you sketch the most likely route from here in Ukraine, it is not a grand chess move or a dramatic collapse. It is something far more familiar in Western politics: a slow, grubby drift towards a bad compromise, wrapped in fine words about “peace” and “pragmatism”.
On one side you have Russia, a centralised security state that knows exactly what it wants. On the other you have a loose coalition of democracies that know what they do not want - a wider war with Russia - but are rather less clear on what they are actually prepared to pay to avoid one. Into that gap steps Trump, blundering about with a “deal” that looks suspiciously like Putin’s wish list with the sharp edges shaved off.
Start with Moscow. Putin’s strategy at this point is not subtle. He is grinding forward a few kilometres at a time, burning through men and ammunition to push the line west, while the West argues with itself about whether to send artillery shells this month or next. He does not need blitzkrieg. He needs the clock. Every village taken is another reality on the ground, another bargaining chip, another depressing headline in Kyiv.
Meanwhile the White House is pushing its own “peace framework” that boils down to this: Ukraine hands over more land it does not currently control, cuts its army to something Russia can live with, swallows restrictions on what weapons it can field, and in return gets some rather hazy “security guarantees” from the same people who cannot even guarantee their own commitment to NATO from one election cycle to the next. It is not hard to see why Putin is in no hurry to compromise. If your opponent is slowly edging towards your position on your behalf, why rush?
Overlay that with the democratic constraint. We have established that NATO cannot and should not copy Russian tactics in the grey zone. Western governments cannot fly anonymous drones over Russian airports and then pretend to know nothing about it. So we are stuck in the responsible lane: proper air defences, careful rules of engagement, lawyers crawling over every strike list. It is the right thing to do, but it also means the repertoire of cheap stunts is largely left to Moscow.
Democracy does not just keep us out of the moral gutter. It also makes big, decisive choices hard. It is far easier for leaders to muddle along with half measures than to tell voters: “This will cost you money and it could be risky, but the alternative is worse.” So we get just enough support to keep Ukraine alive, but not enough to change the fundamental balance, and certainly not enough to break Russia’s grip decisively. Long wars of attrition suit autocracies better than democracies, because autocracies can pretend nothing is happening. Democracies eventually have to go back to the electorate and explain themselves.
Enter Trump, who manages to be both the purest expression of that democratic weakness and, perversely, a threat to it. His great contribution so far has been to persuade half of America that Ukraine is a drain, NATO is a racket and allies are a protection racket that should pay up or be left to their fate. From Putin’s point of view, this is priceless. The one country that gives NATO its credibility is being led by a man who openly questions whether he will turn up at all.
At the same time, Trump is not a reliable Kremlin asset. He is transactional and vain, and that is dangerous to everyone, including Putin. If he smells applause in “ending the war” with a lopsided deal, he will lean on Kyiv to sign. If he smells applause in suddenly being “tough on Russia”, he could just as easily lurch into some theatrical sanctions package or a noisy intelligence operation to prove he is no one’s puppet. Policy is whatever polls well with the base this week. That is precisely the unpredictability generals hate.
So when you map the road ahead, three paths appear, none of them particularly attractive.
The most likely is the weary trudge. Russia keeps creeping forward, Ukraine keeps bleeding, and Western governments keep sending enough support to prevent collapse, but not enough to reverse the tide. Hybrid attacks continue in the background: suspicious anchors “accidentally” cutting cables, drones skimming NATO airspace, mysterious outages that always seem to happen near something important. NATO responds with more patrols, more sensors, more strategy documents, all carefully calibrated not to cross the red line into direct confrontation.
In this version, Trump spends the run up to the midterms talking about “peace” while Ukrainian cities are still being hit. His peace plan never quite lands, because neither Zelensky nor Europe can swallow it outright, but it never quite dies either. It sits there as a constant pressure - a reminder to Kyiv that the chequebook has a political price, and to Moscow that time is still working in its favour. By 2027 we have what is effectively a frozen war with occasional bursts of offensives, and a Ukrainian state that is independent on paper but economically and militarily half starved.
The second path is the Munich option refurbished for the 21st century. Here the sheer grind becomes too much. A particularly bad Russian offensive, a spike in energy prices, a few dramatic cable incidents in the Baltic, and suddenly “pragmatism” begins to sound tempting in Berlin and Paris. The Trump plan, or something close, is rebranded as the only grown up option. Ukraine is told, politely and behind closed doors, that the West will not bankroll a forever war, and that if it wants to keep what is left, it must sign.
This would let Western leaders return home waving bits of paper about “security guarantees” and “end to hostilities”, while Russia keeps a fifth of Ukraine and the strategic initiative. It would be sold as realism. It would, in practice, be a dressed up capitulation. We have seen this film before, and it does not end with peace. It ends with the aggressor deciding that the people he has just humiliated are unlikely to cause trouble next time either.
The third path is the outlier, which is why it will get the least airtime. Either something goes badly wrong - a hybrid attack kills people in a NATO country and triggers a sharp response - or Western politics unexpectedly stiffen. Trump is weakened or contained after the midterms, European governments decide they really cannot live for the next decade with a revanchist Russia parked on their border, and a serious effort is made to rearm Ukraine properly. Not tinkering at the margins, but a conscious decision to treat 2027 as the year the balance must shift.
That path requires something we are not famous for at the moment: strategic patience and honesty with voters. It means telling people that yes, this will be expensive, and no, there are no guarantees, but if you let Putin bank this war as a win, you will be buying more trouble later at a higher price. It also means facing down the Trumps and Farages of this world, who will scream that every shell sent to Ukraine is “money stolen from our own people”, while happily ignoring how much of our economic misery is already the price of their last bright idea.
If you want the punchline, it is this. We are not short of options. We are short of political courage. Authoritarians have a simple strategy: keep pushing until someone stops you. Democracies have a bad habit of waiting until the bill is unpayable before they admit what is happening.
From this point, the most likely route is not heroic defeat or heroic victory. It is a slow slide into a shabby peace that rewards aggression and teaches every would be tyrant watching that if you are brutal and patient enough, the “rules based order” will eventually negotiate with your tanks. Russia knows this. Trump, consciously or otherwise, is helping to prove it.
The question is not whether our system is capable of better. It is whether anyone in charge is prepared to explain to their own voters that “peace at any price” is not peace at all, it is layby on the route to the next war.