Multiculturalism: A Word Looking for a Meaning

Kemi Badenoch has now warned that identity politics could, in the long term, put Britain on a path towards civil war.

Which is quite a way to tell everyone else to calm down.

To be fair, buried under the theatrical sandbags there is a serious point. A country does need a shared civic identity. It does need one law, common institutions, equal citizenship, free speech, and some basic emotional commitment to the place. If the left treats Englishness as something faintly embarrassing, and the right turns it into a bloodline, then we are not improving the national conversation. We are merely handing everyone a slightly sharper stick.

But “civil war” is doing an awful lot of work there. It is the sort of phrase that arrives wearing a tin helmet and then insists it only meant it hypothetically. Badenoch says she doesn’t mean now, which is nice, but once you’ve lobbed “civil war” into the debate, the careful qualification follows behind with a mop and bucket.

And that lands in the same swamp as the regular complaint that “multiculturalism has failed”, usually said in that wonderfully grave tone people use when they think they’ve said something profound rather than merely opened a drawer full of slogans.

It is said as if multiculturalism were some strange experiment introduced sometime around 1997 by Tony Blair, a focus group and a man from Islington with a bicycle helmet. As if, before then, Britain had been a single, seamless, monocultural blancmange, lightly flavoured with Sunday roast and deference to the vicar.

Which is odd, because the first question to ask anyone who says multiculturalism has failed is very simple: what do you mean by multiculturalism? And that’s where the wheels tend to come off the pram.

There is, of course, a serious political philosophy version of multiculturalism, concerned with how a liberal state treats minorities fairly when supposedly neutral rules often reflect the majority culture. Fine. That’s a real argument, and not one to be settled between adverts on a phone-in.

But that is almost never what people mean when they announce that multiculturalism has failed. They usually mean they’ve noticed unfamiliar people doing unfamiliar things, and would like it upgraded into a theory.

Even as policy, I’m wary of the way multiculturalism can slide from equal citizenship into state-sponsored pigeonholes. It can end up taking something that already exists - a country full of different cultures, classes, religions, regions, habits and histories - and laying a policy document over the top of it, as if the act of naming it has somehow achieved something.

A bit like putting a brass plaque on a puddle and calling it a water feature.

The state doesn’t create cultural variety. People do that. So do ports, wars, trade, empire, migration, class, geography and people marrying someone their grandmother would have disapproved of. The useful job of the state is much plainer: protect equal rights, enforce one law, defend individual liberty and make sure nobody gets bullied by either the majority or their own community.

That isn’t multiculturalism. That’s just liberal citizenship, which has the advantage of being older, clearer and less likely to require a steering committee.

But if multiculturalism means a country containing different cultures, customs, classes, accents, religions, foods, manners, social codes and ways of life, then multiculturalism hasn’t failed. It’s just Britain. It has been Britain for about a thousand years, and probably longer if we include all the inconvenient people who arrived before the invention of Facebook outrage.

Start with class, because that punctures the whole balloon.

A white working-class man in Barnsley, a white barrister in Cheltenham, and a white duke pretending not to understand money are not living in the same culture just because they can all be placed under the same census heading. They dress differently, speak differently, eat differently, laugh at different things, read different papers, have different assumptions about authority, education, work, money, manners and whether it’s acceptable to say serviette.

The working class has a culture. The middle class has a culture. The aristocracy has a culture. The pit village had a culture. The Methodist chapel had a culture. The public school had a culture. The merchant navy certainly had a culture, and not one easily mistaken for a Surrey golf club. The City has a culture. The Scots have their own legal system. The Welsh have their own language. The Irish were never just a decorative footnote. Yorkshire continues to regard itself as a sovereign moral authority accidentally attached to England.

So Britain was never monocultural. Not even when it was overwhelmingly white.

And the older influences weren’t all stirred together into one smooth national soup either. They settled unevenly, as cultures usually do. The Norman influence didn’t vanish. It put on a better coat, acquired land, built castles, shaped the law and became the sort of thing people later called tradition. The Viking inheritance is still easier to hear in the north and east, especially in place names and dialect. The Dutch didn’t transform the whole country, but they certainly left their muddy fingerprints on the Fens. The Saxon inheritance sits differently again, more deeply embedded in language, settlement, monarchy and the old southern English story. Britain wasn’t harmonised into one culture. It was layered, patched, argued over and lived in.

Even the language tells on us. We still use Latin every day. Ad hoc. Per capita. Status quo. Habeas corpus. Prima facie. Pro rata. Curriculum vitae. Half the people complaining about foreign influence do so in a language assembled from Germanic roots, Norman French, Latin and whatever else washed ashore with a useful verb.

So when people say multiculturalism has failed, they usually don’t mean cultural difference has failed. Britain is made of cultural difference. What they are usually objecting to is not multiculturalism, but unfamiliar multiculturalism. Different skin colours. Different religions. Different clothes. Different food smells, as if an indigenous southerner confronted with tripe and onions wouldn’t assume civilisation had already collapsed somewhere north of Watford. People speaking another language within earshot of someone still emotionally recovering from decimalisation, although I suspect quite a few of the professionally alarmed would struggle to identify either Welsh or Urdu if they heard them on the London Tube.

And this is where the “they don’t integrate” argument begins to look a little tired around the cuffs.

Because if integration means taking part in the civic life of the country, ethnic minority Britons have done it rather inconveniently well. They vote. They stand for councils. They sit in Parliament. They serve in Cabinet. They become judges, doctors, teachers, soldiers, business owners, police officers, journalists, broadcasters, mayors and ministers. One became Prime Minister. Another became Mayor of London. Kemi Badenoch leads the Conservative Party. Sadiq Khan runs the capital. Lisa Nandy sits in Cabinet. At the time of writing, that is not a picture of people sulking outside the national tent refusing to join in. They’re in the tent, on the platform, arguing into the microphone while everyone else complains about the catering.

And Reform even has its own brown-skinned culture warrior in Zia Yusuf, which is almost too tidy for satire. A British Muslim businessman becomes one of the senior figures in a party whose ecosystem so often feeds on complaints about failed integration, and then the same political current still complains that minorities don’t join the national life. How much more integrated would they like him to be? He has not merely joined British civic life. He has joined the bit of British civic life that goes on television to complain about other people not joining British civic life. That is not failed integration. That is integration with a megaphone and a booking on GB News.

So when people still say “they don’t integrate”, one has to ask what “integrate” now means. Because it clearly doesn’t mean obeying the law. It doesn’t mean learning English. It doesn’t mean getting a job. It doesn’t mean paying taxes. It doesn’t mean voting. It doesn’t mean joining political parties. It doesn’t mean standing for office. It doesn’t mean becoming Mayor of the capital. It doesn’t even mean becoming Prime Minister, which seems a reasonably strenuous test unless one is being unusually fussy.

What it often seems to mean is this: they have integrated, but have inconsiderately remained brown while doing it.

That is the bit nobody wants to say plainly, because it sounds ugly once removed from its respectable packaging. So instead we get misty phrases about values, belonging, culture and cohesion. Some of that matters, obviously. A country does need shared civic norms. But if a brown-skinned person can enter the heart of British public life and still be treated as not quite belonging, then the test was never civic integration. It was ancestry with better table manners.

The Rishi Sunak argument exposed this rather neatly. Born in Southampton, educated here, elected here, Chancellor here, Prime Minister here, and still some people wanted to say he was British but not really English. At that point behaviour, loyalty, law, language and contribution have all been quietly moved aside. The real test has become bloodline. And once politics starts sniffing around bloodlines, it rarely improves the furniture.

That doesn’t mean every cultural practice should be accepted. Obviously not. This is where the grown-up distinction matters, which is probably why it so rarely survives contact with a phone-in.

A liberal country can contain many cultures. It cannot contain rival legal orders. It can tolerate different customs. It cannot tolerate unequal citizenship. Mosques, temples, synagogues, churches, Polish shops, Caribbean churches, curry houses, Diwali lights and Chinese New Year are not a threat to the state, unless the state is being held together with Blu Tack and resentment.

What it can’t tolerate is rights varying by tribe. It can’t tolerate women and children being subordinated to family honour, or criticism of ideas being treated as bigotry. And it certainly can’t tolerate self-appointed community leaders pretending they outrank individual conscience.

The line isn’t colour, religion or surname. It’s much duller than that, which is probably why nobody wants to shout about it on a phone-in. One law, equal citizenship, free speech, secular courts, and the right to leave your community without being treated as a traitor.

That is not an argument against cultural variety. It’s an argument for civic liberalism. You can have different cultures, different customs and different festivals, but the public square still needs one set of rules, otherwise it stops being a country and becomes a badly chaired residents’ association with flags.

So perhaps multiculturalism is a useless word, at least in ordinary political shouting. The serious version is about fairness, recognition and the limits of state neutrality. The phone-in version is usually about visible ethnic or religious difference. Class culture doesn’t count. Regional culture doesn’t count. Historical regional culture is allowed to call itself heritage, which is rather convenient.

Naval officers eating kedgeree and saying peculiar things at breakfast somehow count as British tradition, but a Sikh family keeping Punjabi customs becomes multiculturalism.

It’s not analysis. It’s selective noticing. It’s noticing the bits you’ve decided to be frightened of, and calling the rest heritage.

Which is a poor basis for national panic, but a surprisingly good one for a phone-in.

Mutually Assured Hesitation

There is something wonderfully human about the fact that after eighty years of nuclear strategy, megadeaths, mutually assured destruction, launch-on-warning systems, submarine patrols, hardened silos and men in underground bunkers staring at radar screens, the ultimate solution may simply be: "Fine. The moment you fire one, it blows up in your own face."

I was watching Mr Mercedes when the idea struck me. Somewhere between the psychopaths and the psychological tension, my brain wandered off into thermonuclear geopolitics, as brains occasionally do. What fascinated me was not merely the violence in the series, but the way Brady Hartsfield weaponises ordinary systems. Traffic lights. Consumer electronics. Remote interference. Tiny technological vulnerabilities sitting quietly inside modern life like loose wiring behind a plasterboard wall.

The brilliance of Brady Hartsfield's little traffic-light gadget was not that viewers fully believed it. It was that they believed it just enough. That is modern fear in a sentence.

During the Cold War, terror was theatrical. Giant missiles rolled through Red Square. Bomber fleets thundered overhead. Concrete bunkers disappeared into mountainsides while grim men smoked over radar screens. Modern fear is quieter. Software corruption. Satellite spoofing. Hacked infrastructure. Invisible electronic interference buried somewhere inside systems nobody fully understands anymore. Half the time, one suspects governments themselves do not fully understand them either, which is not perhaps as reassuring as it ought to be.

And somewhere in the middle of all that, my brain produced this idea.

What if there were a system that detected the launch of any nuclear missile and detonated it seconds after firing? Not over London. Not over Moscow. Not over Beijing. Over the launch country itself. The ultimate anti-nuclear weapon. Not a shield. A boomerang.

For decades, nuclear powers have played a bizarre game of logic in which peace is maintained by threatening planetary suicide. We call this "deterrence" because "permanently armed hostage situation" sounds less alarming than the truth during election campaigns. Entire generations of strategists built careers around the idea that civilisation survives because everyone remains equally terrified and sleep deprived.

And to be fair, it mostly worked. Which is faint praise in the same sense that saying a parachute "mostly opened" is faint praise.

The problem with nuclear weapons is that they are simultaneously unusable and indispensable. Every serious government knows using them would be catastrophic. Yet every serious government also believes not having them would be catastrophic. So humanity ended up in the absurd position of manufacturing thousands of devices whose only successful use is never using them.

Then along comes this idea. A system that makes launching one functionally identical to dropping it vertically onto your own forehead.

Suddenly the entire macho theatre collapses. No more triumphant music over missile parades. No more stern men standing beside giant rockets named things like Peacekeeper or Topol or Trident. No more internet commentators discussing "tactical exchanges" as though nuclear war were a difficult away fixture in the Europa League.

Because the moment the missile leaves the silo, your own country becomes the impact zone. It is the first truly honest nuclear doctrine.

But then the idea mutated slightly. The system does not even have to exist. That is where it becomes genuinely interesting.

Suppose a country simply claimed it possessed the ability to detect the intended impact zone of any incoming nuclear missile and remotely trigger or corrupt the warhead before arrival. Not during tests. Not during routine launches. Only if the target were themselves.

Now nobody can properly verify the claim.

You cannot realistically test it by lobbing a nuclear missile at Washington just to see what happens. Even dictators tend to struggle with the diplomatic paperwork afterwards. Which means the entire thing enters that strange grey zone where nuclear deterrence has always lived anyway: uncertainty.

The enemy cannot know whether it is nonsense, but they also cannot really afford to discover, the hard way and slightly too late, that it was not nonsense after all. And suddenly deterrence no longer depends on certainty of retaliation. It depends on uncertainty of interception.

Which feels oddly modern. The Cold War was all concrete silos, giant radar dishes and men smoking over maps. This would be pure twenty-first century strategy. Cyberwarfare, algorithms, satellites, classified programmes with names like Project Perseus and ministers vaguely hinting at capabilities they cannot discuss during interviews with the BBC.

You would probably know the programme existed because somebody from the Ministry of Defence would accidentally mention it while trying to explain why the procurement budget had doubled again.

But in truth, it is also ancient.

Medieval castles worked partly on exactly the same principle. A fortress did not merely need to be impregnable. It needed to look sufficiently difficult, expensive and uncertain to attack that many enemies simply decided not to bother. Naval warfare later evolved its own version in the form of the "fleet in being" - a fleet powerful enough that its mere existence forced the enemy to alter plans even if it never left harbour.

The Cold War itself ran heavily on bluff, ambiguity and educated guesswork. Neither side truly knew whether all its systems would function under real attack, whether commanders would obey orders, whether submarines would survive, or whether escalation models worked outside RAND Corporation flowcharts. Civilisation has basically spent eighty years conducting an engineering experiment it desperately hopes never to perform.

Even Reagan's famous Star Wars project carried this flavour. A great many experts doubted whether the technology could ever work properly. But the uncertainty mattered. If the Soviets believed America might eventually neutralise their deterrent, then the strategic balance shifted anyway.

Half the deterrent effect would come from ambiguity itself. A retired admiral muttering darkly at a think tank conference in Wiltshire would probably do half the work alone. There would also inevitably be somebody on GB News insisting Britain secretly had the capability in the 1980s until political correctness stopped us deploying it.

The beauty of it is that tests would still work normally. Nuclear powers could continue reassuring themselves with missiles splashing harmlessly into distant oceans while quietly wondering whether the real mechanism only activates when the warhead is genuinely inbound.

Which means every launch calculation acquires another small layer of doubt. And nuclear strategy already resembles a vast tower constructed almost entirely from doubt, caffeine and people pretending to sound calmer than they really are.

Of course, the flaw is obvious. Bluff-based deterrence works right up until somebody calls the bluff. Human beings are not especially good at managing existential poker games. We struggle to organise airport baggage systems. The idea that civilisation survives because no unstable leader ever miscalculates at three in the morning after reading his own propaganda is, frankly, slightly alarming.

There is also the unavoidable possibility that governments would spend twenty years and several billion pounds developing this entirely fictional capability, producing thousands of consultancy jobs, six strategy white papers and a dramatic presentation in Swindon explaining why phase three of the resilience architecture had been delayed due to stakeholder engagement issues.

Still, there is something strangely elegant about the concept.

Nuclear deterrence has always rested not on morality, law or wisdom, but consequences. The reason nuclear war has not happened since 1945 is not because humanity became enlightened. It is because even the maddest governments usually prefer continuing to exist.

My fictional system merely weaponises hesitation itself. Which, when you think about it, is probably fortunate, because the alternative is trusting civilisation to software updates and sleep-deprived men in bunkers.

Two-Tier Slogans and One-Tier Law

There is a serious question hiding underneath all the shouting about two-tier policing, and it deserves better than being turned into another Farage-shaped foghorn.

That question is not whether Britain is secretly run by a vast anti-white conspiracy. That is the version for people who prefer their politics microwaved. The serious question is whether official anti-racism guidance has, in places, drifted from equal treatment into differential treatment, and whether that can confuse judgement in moments when the police most need clarity.

Equality before the law is not a decorative phrase. It means that when police arrive at a violent scene, they assess facts, risk and need. Who is injured? Who is armed? Who is lying? Who needs help? Who is the immediate danger?

It should not begin with a mental flowchart about group identity.

Anti-racism in policing is not a bad thing. Quite the opposite. There have been real failures in British policing, some of them shameful, and any serious police service should want to remove prejudice, improve trust and make sure every citizen is treated fairly. That is not woke nonsense. That is basic competence.

But good intentions do not make bad wording harmless.

If guidance tells officers that equality does not mean treating everyone the same, that may make sense in a policy seminar. Different communities may have different histories, different levels of trust, different experiences of policing. Fine. We can all nod thoughtfully and pass the biscuits.

And of course different circumstances sometimes require different handling. Translation, disability, vulnerability, safeguarding and medical need all matter. Nobody sensible is arguing that every person in every situation should be processed like identical tins of beans. But none of that should mean identity outranks evidence in an emergency.

Police will always make rapid provisional judgements. They have to. In a football hooligan situation, for example, officers may arrive with a pretty good working assumption about what sort of trouble they’re dealing with, and who may be involved. That is not automatically prejudice. It is often experience under pressure. But it must stay provisional. The moment the facts point the other way, the assumption has to move.

If the person you thought was the aggressor says he has been stabbed and cannot breathe, you check. You do not let the first story harden into the only story.

That is why the Henry Nowak case matters beyond the horror of the murder itself. Henry was killed by Vickrum Digwa, who then lied about him and falsely claimed racial abuse. Police arrived into that lie. They had to make quick decisions, and some of those decisions now look dreadful.

Whether those decisions were caused by bad judgement, bad training, fear of a racism allegation, flawed guidance, confusion, or simple operational failure is exactly what needs investigating.

But the question is legitimate.

And this is where the usual shouting becomes so useless. The phrase two-tier policing has become both a slogan and a smoke machine. It allows some people to jump straight from a real case to a fully assembled conspiracy. No investigation required. No evidence needed. Just insert rage and press share.

But dismissing the question because the wrong people are shouting about it is just as lazy. If official guidance is unclear, or if officers feel under pressure to treat accusations of racism as a trump card before they have checked the facts, then that is not equality. It is institutional nervousness pretending to be justice.

The law should not be colour-blind in the stupid sense of pretending history never happened. But operational policing cannot become colour-led either. There is a difference between understanding context and letting identity outrank evidence.

And there is another side to this, because operational decisions are also shaped by real behaviour in the real world. If minorities are being targeted, threatened or abused by the same people shouting about two-tier policing, police cannot simply pretend that context doesn’t exist. In a heated moment, that may quite properly affect risk assessment. The danger is not officers noticing context. The danger is officers letting context become a shortcut.

And there’s the irony. The likes of Tommy Robinson complain that police make assumptions around race and public order, while helping to create the very atmosphere in which those assumptions become more likely. If you spend years turning minority communities into targets, don’t be surprised when police arrive at tense scenes with that risk somewhere in their thinking. You may be complaining about a problem you helped manufacture.

If someone claims racism, take it seriously. But taking it seriously does not mean believing it automatically, especially when someone else is bleeding, collapsing or saying they cannot breathe.

The police do a hard job. They deal with lies, fear, violence, intoxication, panic and half a dozen people all shouting different versions of reality. That is precisely why their guidance has to be clear. Not clever. Not fashionable. Not written to satisfy a committee. Clear.

In an emergency, the rule should be simple: evidence first, risk first, life first.

If anti-racism helps police treat every citizen fairly, good. If it helps officers understand why some communities distrust the police, good. If it improves standards and removes prejudice, good. But if it creates hesitation, distorted priorities or a fear of being accused of racism that interferes with basic judgement, then it has failed. Not because anti-racism is wrong, but because equality has been lost in the paperwork.

The answer is not to abandon anti-racism. Nor is it to pretend every criticism of guidance is secretly racist. The answer is to rewrite bad guidance, retrain where necessary, and make the operational principle brutally clear: every person at a scene is to be assessed by conduct, evidence, injury and risk, not by the racial politics of the situation.

There is a real danger here, and it comes from both directions. One side wants to turn Henry Nowak’s death into proof of an anti-white state. That is reckless, ugly and unsupported. The other side may be tempted to wave away any concern about differential treatment because the far right has got its hands on the phrase. That is also wrong.

A serious country should be able to hold two thoughts at once, even if this now seems to be regarded as a dangerously advanced manoeuvre.

Racism exists. Police failures exist. False racism allegations exist. Bad guidance can exist. Institutional over-correction can exist. Minority targeting exists. None of those facts cancels the others.

The Henry Nowak investigation needs to establish what actually happened. Did officers fail because they were misled? Did they make poor assumptions? Did guidance or training affect how they interpreted the scene? Did fear of being accused of racism play any part? Did they simply miss the medical emergency in front of them?

Those are factual questions. They deserve factual answers. What they do not deserve is a mob chanting two-tier before the evidence is in, or a bureaucracy pretending that every line of guidance is beyond criticism because its intentions were good.

If guidance has blurred the principle, fix the guidance. If training has muddled it, fix the training. If officers failed Henry Nowak, say so plainly.

But do not replace one unfairness with another and call it progress. That is not justice. It is just a different route to the same ditch.

Supermarket Basil - Hope Over Reality

There is something faintly accusatory about a supermarket basil plant. You bring it home full of optimism, place it on the kitchen windowsill like an Italian herbaceous pet, water it carefully, maybe even say something absurd like, "This time I'll look after it properly." Then within four days it resembles a Victorian child recovering from consumption.

The problem is that supermarkets are not really selling you a basil plant. They are selling you something halfway between a garnish and a temporary display item. The pot contains about seventeen basil plants crammed together in conditions more suited to a refugee boat crossing the Channel. They look lush in the shop because they have been force-grown in perfect commercial greenhouse conditions with controlled light, warmth and watering. Then they arrive in a British kitchen in May where the temperature swings between Tuscany and Cape Horn every six hours.

People always say, very smugly, "You need to split them into separate pots." Yes. Because apparently when buying a £1.35 herb plant you are expected to embark upon a horticultural evacuation exercise involving compost, drainage and root separation surgery. The moment you tip the thing out of the pot you discover the roots form a solid white cube of despair.

And basil is a diva. Parsley will tolerate neglect. Mint would survive a nuclear exchange. Rosemary practically thrives on contempt. Basil, meanwhile, reacts to a cool breeze like a Downton Abbey lady hearing unpleasant trade news.

The truly maddening thing is that one surviving supermarket basil plant can become enormous if treated correctly. You occasionally encounter someone with a thriving basil bush the size of a Victorian fern, and they always explain the process with infuriating calm. "Oh, I just repotted it immediately, pinched out the tops, monitored soil moisture, rotated it for even light, and fed it weekly." At which point you realise they have accidentally turned basil into something requiring a maintenance schedule and written records.

Most supermarket basil plants do not die. They are simply completing the brief for which they were designed. Which is to look optimistic beside mozzarella for approximately 72 hours.

Public Danger Pretending to Be Public Concern

Henry Nowak’s family asked for his death not to be used to create more hatred, division or tension. You’d think that would be a fairly easy request to respect. Their son and brother was murdered. They want truth, accountability, and safer streets.

Naturally, the people who live off public anger had other ideas.

And let’s be clear, there’s plenty here to be angry about. Henry Nowak was murdered by Vickrum Digwa, who then lied about him, falsely claimed racial abuse, and helped create a situation in which a dying young man was treated as a suspect. The police response needs proper investigation. The law on carrying large religious blades may well need looking at. None of that should be brushed aside.

And there is a practical answer on that point. A kirpan does not have to be a large, sharp, accessible dagger. A small fixed-blade steel kirpan, with a blade of no more than about three inches, sheathed, secured and worn discreetly, can meet the religious requirement while also respecting the ordinary legal expectation that bladed articles should be small, controlled and carried responsibly. That is equality before the law, not an attack on faith.

The existence of a practical solution matters, because it exposes the whole performance. If the religious requirement can be respected, the law applied fairly, and public safety protected, then the shouting isn’t about solving the problem. It’s about keeping the problem politically useful.

But rioting doesn’t answer any of it.

It doesn’t bring Henry back. It doesn’t help his family. It doesn’t explain why police believed Digwa. It doesn’t explain why Henry kept saying he’d been stabbed and couldn’t breathe, yet still ended up handcuffed. It doesn’t clarify the law. It just turns a murder case into street disorder.

And that’s the central absurdity. They say Henry Nowak’s death proves the streets are dangerous, then they turn up and make the streets more dangerous. This isn’t public safety. It’s public danger pretending to be public concern.

Most of us aren’t fooled by the excuses. We’ve seen this routine far too often. First comes the tragedy. Then comes the claim that nobody is allowed to talk about it, usually while everyone is very loudly talking about it. Then comes the slide from individual guilt to collective blame. Digwa did this, therefore Sikhs. One false allegation was made, therefore all racism claims are suspect. Police failed here, therefore the whole country is run by an anti-white conspiracy.

That isn’t analysis. It’s grievance politics with a dead young man in the middle.

And the hypocrisy is hard to miss. There have been reverse cases, of course: racist murders, mosque attacks, far-right terrorism. Yet those cases don’t produce the same marching, filming, shouting and flag-waving from the far right. Then, suddenly, they discover individual responsibility. Then we’re told not to generalise, not to politicise, not to blame a whole community.

Which is, oddly enough, exactly the standard they abandon the moment the victim and perpetrator fit their preferred script. So no, this isn’t really about making streets safer. If it were, they’d care about all citizens being safe in all streets, not just the cases that come with a useful racial angle and a ready-made slogan.

That’s why the far right is dangerous. Not just because it’s ugly, racist and loud, although it usually manages those without much effort. It’s dangerous because it targets the democratic machinery itself.

The police aren’t to be investigated, they’re to be declared captured. The courts aren’t to punish the murderer, they’re to be dismissed as part of the rigged system. The media aren’t to be challenged to report accurately, they’re to be accused of hiding the truth. Parliament isn’t to review the law, it’s to be denounced as treacherous.

By the time they’ve finished, no inquiry will be good enough, no judge honest enough, no journalist independent enough, and no democratic process legitimate enough. All that’s left is the crowd, the rumour, and the bloke on the livestream telling everyone he alone can see what’s really going on.

We’ve seen versions of that in Europe before. Different uniforms, different slogans, no livestreams obviously, but the method is uncomfortably familiar. Undermine trust in courts, newspapers, parliament and the police, then present the angry crowd as the only honest voice left. It didn’t end well then, and adding broadband hasn’t improved the recipe.

And then there’s the flag business. The same people who spend half their lives warning about no-go areas now seem oddly keen on creating their own. Streets draped in flags, not as celebration, but as warning. The Union flag and the St George’s flag aren’t the problem. They belong to all of us. But when they’re used to mark out territory, the message changes. It stops being national pride and starts looking like intimidation.

So they claim to want safer streets, then riot. They claim to oppose no-go areas, then make ordinary people feel unwelcome in their own streets. They claim to speak for the country, then narrow the country down to whoever looks right, sounds right, votes right and waves the flag in the approved mood.

The decent response isn’t complicated. Hold Digwa responsible. Find out why police believed him. Find out why Henry wasn’t believed quickly enough. If police guidance contributed to bad judgement, review it properly. Publish what can properly be published. Let the family have the truth.

There is a difference between demanding accountability and hunting for targets. One seeks facts. The other seeks an enemy. None of this requires a mob. In fact the mob makes it easier for everyone to talk about disorder instead of the original failures.

What you don’t do is frighten Sikh families, threaten police officers, make the streets worse, and then claim you’re acting for a grieving family who specifically asked people not to do this.

That’s the nastiest part of it. They are not amplifying the family’s wishes. They are overruling them. Henry’s father said he wanted his son’s story to help make streets safer for everyone.

For everyone. Not just for people useful to a slogan.

The rioting achieves nothing except more anger. And of course, more anger is the point. It keeps the clips circulating, the followers excited, the donations coming, and the hard men feeling terribly brave in a crowd.

Meanwhile, the police still need investigating, the law may still need reviewing, Sikh families are left looking over their shoulders, and ordinary people still have to get to work, take the kids to school, and nip out for milk without wondering whether the pavement has become someone else’s political theatre.

The Triple Lock

Prepare for a long read. I heard someone ask the other day, quite reasonably, why pensioners get a Triple Lock while the working population does not.

And on the face of it, it is a fair question. If pensions rise by whichever is highest - inflation, wages or 2.5% - why should wages not get the same treatment? Why should the retired get the nice little ratchet mechanism while the working population gets a performance review, a motivational poster in the staff kitchen, and a reminder that “times are difficult”?

It sounds fair. It sounds symmetrical. It has that attractive pub-logic quality where everyone nods for about thirty seconds before someone remembers the electricity bill.

The first problem is that wages are not just income. Wages are also costs. If every worker’s pay is automatically lifted by the highest of inflation, earnings growth or 2.5%, then every employer’s wage bill rises whether the business can afford it or not. The big firms grumble and pass some of it on. The marginal ones cut hours, delay hiring, raise prices, or simply disappear from the high street, to be replaced by a vape shop and a sense of decline.

And then, because prices have risen, inflation rises. And because inflation has risen, wages rise again. At which point the whole thing starts to look less like fairness and more like a circular argument with direct debit facilities.

Pensions are different in one important respect. They do not directly increase the cost of producing a loaf of bread, running a care home, staffing a hotel, or keeping a restaurant open on a wet Tuesday in February. But they absolutely do increase spending power. Pensioners buy food, energy, insurance, holidays, meals out, garden supplies, Christmas presents and occasionally suspiciously expensive bird seed. So of course pension uprating contributes to demand. It is not inflation-free fairy dust sprinkled from the cardigan cupboard.

The awkward bit is that the State Pension is not a tiny corner of the welfare state. It is the biggest bit. DWP figures say around 55% of social security spending goes to pensioners. In 2025/26, pensioner benefits are forecast at £177.7 billion, including £146.1 billion on the State Pension. There were 13.2 million people receiving the State Pension in August 2025.

So when politicians talk about “benefits”, they often do so in a tone that suggests a man in a tracksuit smoking outside a betting shop. But the largest slice of the benefits bill goes to pensioners. That is not an opinion. It is arithmetic, which is always inconvenient when everyone has turned up carrying a prejudice.

So we have ended up with a strange moral hierarchy. A pension rising automatically is “dignity in retirement”. A working-age benefit rising properly is “dependency”. A public sector worker asking not to get poorer is “unaffordable”. A young renter facing half their income disappearing into someone else’s buy-to-let is told to stop buying coffee, which would at least be more convincing if a flat now cost the same multiple of earnings as it did when the advice-giver bought one.

The Triple Lock may have made sense when pensioner poverty was the great neglected problem. It was crude, but politics often likes crude tools because they fit neatly on a leaflet. The trouble is that once a crude policy becomes a sacred object, nobody is allowed to ask whether it is still doing the same job.

Because pensioners are not all poor. Some are, and they need proper protection. But some own homes outright, have occupational pensions, savings, investments, and a winter fuel payment debate conducted with the moral delicacy of a man defending his second helping of pudding. Meanwhile, plenty of working people are paying rent, childcare, commuting costs, council tax, energy bills, student debt, and National Insurance, while being told that asking for security is fiscally reckless.

There is also the small matter that pensioners vote. Reliably. In large numbers. With the grim punctuality of people who still know where their polling card is and regard civic duty as something slightly more important than updating TikTok. They are also a large and growing voter bloc, which means the Triple Lock is not merely a pensions policy. It is an electoral forcefield. Touch it and every party strategist starts hearing distant church bells and the sound of marginal seats falling over.

But underneath all that lies the bigger problem, which is not sentiment, fairness or even electoral cowardice. It is demography.

The workforce is not growing fast enough to carry an ever-growing retired population on ever-more generous terms. The State Pension is not a savings account with everyone’s contributions sitting in a labelled biscuit tin somewhere in Whitehall. Today’s pensions are largely paid from today’s taxes. That means today’s workers are paying for today’s pensioners, just as tomorrow’s workers will be expected to pay for us.

That arrangement works tolerably well when there are plenty of workers for every pensioner. It becomes rather more awkward when the number of pensioners rises and the working-age population does not keep pace. At that point the promise does not vanish. It just moves. It lands on younger workers through tax, on public services through cuts, on the national debt through borrowing, or on future pensioners through later retirement and lower uprating.

This is the bit politicians dislike saying out loud. The Triple Lock is not just a kindness to current pensioners. It is a claim on the future earnings of a workforce that is smaller than we would like, less securely housed than it used to be, and already carrying tuition debt, childcare costs, rent, National Insurance, frozen tax thresholds and the general pleasure of being told to work harder by people who bought houses when they cost about three decent salaries and a packet of crisps.

You can raise the pension age, but that hits manual workers and the less healthy hardest. You can increase immigration, but then half the same politicians who defend the Triple Lock start shouting about numbers. You can raise productivity, which is the elegant answer, except Britain has been promising that since roughly the invention of the fax machine. Or you can trim the generosity of pension uprating for those who do not need it. That is not cruelty. That is arithmetic arriving with its coat on.

So the question “why not give workers a Triple Lock too?” is useful, not because the answer is “yes, let’s do that”, but because it exposes the oddness of the original lock. If applying the same principle to wages would be inflationary, unaffordable and economically dangerous, perhaps we should at least admit that applying it permanently to the largest benefit in the system is not an act of divine wisdom either.

And if one of the three locks has to go, it should be the 2.5% floor.

The earnings link has a logic. It stops pensioners falling behind the working population over time. The inflation link also has a logic. It stops pensioners being made poorer in real terms when prices rise. But the 2.5% guarantee is the odd one. It says pensions should rise by at least 2.5% even when inflation is low and wages are barely moving. That is not protection against poverty. That is a ratchet.

A Double Lock of earnings or inflation would still protect pensioners from falling behind either prices or workers. It would remove the extra upward tick that keeps lifting the baseline even in years when the economy has not really justified it. The Institute for Fiscal Studies has estimated that the Triple Lock could add somewhere between £5 billion and £40 billion a year to State Pension spending by 2050, compared with earnings indexation, depending on how the economy performs. That is quite a large uncertainty range, admittedly, but even the bottom end is not exactly loose change found in the Treasury sofa.

Then comes the nastier question: should the State Pension itself be means-tested or tapered?

The politically survivable answer is to start any taper at about £50,000 of taxable income. That sounds neat because it roughly tracks the higher-rate tax threshold. It also avoids hitting people on quite ordinary retirement incomes. But it would not save enough to matter very much. It would be reform by press release.

The necessary answer is lower, and therefore much uglier. If the country actually wanted serious savings, the taper would probably have to start somewhere around £30,000 to £35,000 of other taxable income, excluding the State Pension itself. Then it could be withdrawn at, say, £1 of State Pension for every £3 of income above that. Since the full new State Pension is now £241.30 a week, about £12,548 a year, that would mean someone starting the taper at £30,000 would lose the full amount once their other income reached roughly £68,000. Start at £35,000 and the full loss comes at about £73,000.

That is the zone where the savings become real. Not theoretical. Not symbolic. Real.

The exact saving would need proper DWP and HMRC modelling, because it depends on whether you assess individuals or households, how you treat savings, how many people rearrange their income, and how many lawyers suddenly develop a touching interest in pension planning. These are not official savings estimates, but they show the scale. If you withdrew an average of £2,500 from two million better-off pensioners, that is £5 billion a year. If you withdrew an average of £5,000 from two million, that is £10 billion. If four million pensioners lost an average of £4,000, that is £16 billion. That is enough to matter.

That is the hard version. It saves real money, but it also hits people who did what governments told them to do: save, contribute, build a private pension, and do not rely entirely on the state. It would not only hit the very rich. It would hit retired teachers, police officers, civil servants, managers, engineers, small landlords, widows with inherited pensions, and a fair number of people who thought prudence was supposed to be rewarded rather than entered on a spreadsheet as a recoverable offence.

There is a cleaner halfway house. Keep the Triple Lock for pensioners below, say, £50,000 of taxable income, but above that level reduce it to a single lock. Personally, I would make that single lock inflation. If you are living mainly on the State Pension, you need protection against inflation, wage growth and the general drift of living standards. If you are already on more than £50,000 a year in retirement, the state does not need to keep handing you the full ratchet. It only needs to stop the State Pension being eroded by prices.

That is not taking away the State Pension. It is not even freezing it. It is simply saying that the full Triple Lock is poverty protection, not a loyalty bonus for people with a good final salary pension and a conservatory.

To avoid a cliff edge, you could phase it. Full Triple Lock below £50,000, a blended uplift between £50,000 and £60,000, and inflation-only above £60,000. That way someone does not suddenly lose out because they crossed the line by £200 after cashing in a modest investment or receiving a slightly better occupational pension increase.

Would that be easy to apply? Not especially. It is easier than means-testing the whole State Pension, but not easy in the cheerful ministerial sense of “we have made a colourful flow chart”.

The main practical problem is that the State Pension is paid by DWP, while the relevant income information sits with HMRC. So you would need a routine annual data match between HMRC taxable income and DWP pension uprating. Technically possible, yes. Administratively elegant, no. This is Britain. We can make a paperclip require a login, a reference number and a forty-minute call queue.

The next problem is timing. Pension uprating is set before the tax year’s income is fully known. So the system would probably have to use the previous completed tax year’s income. That creates odd cases. Someone retires and has one unusually high income year. Someone sells investments and briefly crosses the line. Someone’s rental income varies. Someone draws down a pension pot one year and not the next. Someone’s income creeps above the threshold because their occupational pension rises with inflation.

So you would need smoothing, averaging, or an appeals process. Otherwise you would get the usual British administrative genius: a policy designed to save money, followed by a helpline playing Vivaldi to furious retired accountants.

There is also the question of whether the test is individual or household-based. The State Pension is an individual entitlement, but real household finances are often shared. A pensioner on £20,000 with a spouse on £90,000 is in a different position from a pensioner living alone on £20,000. If you assess households, the system becomes more intrusive. If you assess individuals, it is simpler but easier to game. There is no completely clean answer. There rarely is, which is why slogans are so much more popular than policy.

AI could make some of that easier. It could match DWP and HMRC records, spot unusual one-off income spikes, flag cases for human review, calculate which uprating rule applies, pre-fill forms, detect avoidance patterns, and explain decisions in plain English. This is precisely the sort of dull administrative plumbing where AI ought to be useful, rather than pretending to write poetry about brand values for a yoghurt company.

A decent system could say: this pensioner was below £50,000 last year, so the full Triple Lock applies. This one was between £50,000 and £60,000, so the blended uplift applies. This one was above £60,000, so inflation-only applies. This one made a one-off pension withdrawal or sold an asset, so a human being should look at it before the machine does something stupid in twelve-point font.

But AI does not answer the hard questions. It cannot decide the moral threshold. It cannot decide whether the test should be individual or household-based. It cannot decide whether a widow with inherited pension income is in the same position as a retired executive with rental properties. Those are political and ethical choices, not software bugs.

Nor should anyone want an algorithm quietly reducing pension upratings without proper audit trails, appeal rights and human override. Otherwise we simply replace “computer says no” with “algorithm says no”, which is the same misery with better marketing and a larger invoice.

Still, the principle is sound enough. Below £50,000, keep the Triple Lock. Between £50,000 and £60,000, phase it down. Above £60,000, inflation-only. Use taxable income, ignore capital itself, count taxable income from pensions, rent, savings and investments, and do it annually rather than turning it into a monthly bureaucratic pantomime.

And Britain should not pretend this is administratively unimaginable. Australia already does something much more direct. Its Age Pension is openly means-tested, using both an income test and an assets test. The family home is treated separately, but other income and assets are assessed, and the lower entitlement wins. It is not perfect, and I dare say it keeps a healthy number of accountants in shoes, but the sky has not fallen in. Australia still has pensioners, elections, suburbs, barbecues and people shouting at the television.

This matters because Britain has a habit of treating any serious discussion of pension means-testing as if someone has proposed putting a parking meter outside the Cenotaph. But other countries do make distinctions between poorer and richer pensioners. They do not all simply hand the same increase to everyone and call it fairness because it avoids a difficult conversation.

If ministers had courage, they would do the halfway house. Keep the State Pension universal, scrap the 2.5% Triple Lock floor, and limit the full uprating protection to those who actually need it. If ministers had only cunning, they would claw back more from affluent pensioners through the tax system and hope nobody noticed the plumbing.

The halfway-house option would not save as much as a hard means-test. But it would save something, and more importantly it would establish the principle that pension protection should be strongest where pension need is greatest. Which sounds dangerously like fairness, so naturally it would have to be introduced very quietly, possibly while everyone was distracted by a reshuffle, a royal balcony, or a minister getting trapped in a spreadsheet.

But none of this escapes the central problem. A growing pensioner population cannot be permanently insulated from economic reality while the bill is handed to a working population that is proportionately smaller, poorer in assets, and already being asked to fund everything else.

The real scandal is not that pensioners are protected. Poor pensioners should be protected. The scandal is pretending that age alone is a claim to ever-rising protection, while need, wealth, housing security and the number of workers paying the bill are treated as awkward details to be hidden behind a Union Jack and a campaign leaflet.

The trouble is that all these options require politics to distinguish between poor pensioners and comfortable pensioners, between need and entitlement, between fairness and bribery, between demographics and wishful thinking, and between economics and doorstep slogans.

So naturally we will not do that.

We will carry on calling pension spending “earned”, working-age support “welfare”, and wage demands “inflationary”, while a large automatic ratchet sits in the middle of the public finances wearing slippers and daring any politician to touch it.

A Real Espresso

There are moments when you discover that an entire industry has quietly normalised something daft.

Mine came while fiddling with the little red Nespresso machine, which was meant to be the escape from fiddling with coffee machines.

The Gaggia has now gone, and the new owner seems happy with it. Good. I hope they enjoy it. It’s a handsome thing, and in the right hands it’ll no doubt produce excellent coffee. Those hands, however, are no longer mine. I have retired from standing in the kitchen before breakfast trying to interpret the emotional state of a damp coffee puck.

The Nespresso arrived dispensing about 40ml for an espresso, which may be correct according to the machine, but looked rather generous to me. In Italy an espresso is a small, sharp event. It arrives, you drink it, and life resumes. Nobody starts cradling it like a pint of mild.

So I reprogrammed it. Hold the button down, release it when there’s enough in the cup, and the machine remembers. Very clever. Also slightly dangerous, because it meant my first act after abandoning coffee faff was to introduce coffee faff.

I cut it down to something nearer 25ml, and annoyingly, it was better. Stronger. Tidier. More like the little Italian espresso I had in mind, and less like the machine had got distracted and left the tap running.

Which does make you wonder why 40ml became the default. I suspect because people like to feel they’re getting a bit more. We’ve trained ourselves to confuse volume with value, which is why coffee chains now sell cups large enough to bail out a dinghy.

The Italians don’t seem to have fallen for this quite so badly. They still produce something small, concentrated and over with before anyone has had time to say mouthfeel.

So yes, the Nespresso has now been optimised. After all that. After the Gaggia, the grinder, the tamping, the cleaning and the solemn vow to simplify my coffee life, I’ve immediately started adjusting the replacement machine.

Still, at least this time the adjustment involved holding down one button rather than joining a forum and pretending to understand pressure curves.

Banned, Therefore Advertised

Two American political commentators, Hasan Piker and Cenk Uygur, were due to come to Britain. One was expected at SXSW London, the other also had an Oxford Union appearance in the diary. Then the Home Office cancelled their travel authorisations on the grounds that their presence here might not be conducive to the public good.

That phrase always has a certain charm, doesn’t it? Not conducive to the public good. It sounds as though the nation might catch damp if the wrong person stands too near a microphone.

And now, having barred them from speaking in rooms in Britain, the Government has helped turn them into an international free speech story.

Splendid.

Since when has banning someone with an internet following ever achieved its aim?

I can see the Home Office theory. Stop them getting on a plane, stop them standing on a stage, stop the awkward clips, job done. Very tidy. Very official. Possibly there was even a meeting with lanyards and mineral water. But in the real world, where people have phones, livestreams, podcasts and the attention span required to click on a scandal, it does the exact opposite.

It doesn’t silence them. It advertises them.

Before this, plenty of people in Britain had probably never heard of Hasan Piker or Cenk Uygur. Now they have. They’ve been given the one thing no political commentator can buy quite so cheaply: a story in which they’re not merely arguing a point, they’re the banned men. The men the British state apparently couldn’t risk allowing into a room with microphones, bottled water and the usual earnest questions from the floor.

That is not suppression. That is marketing.

And of course their platforms aren’t banned. Their channels are still there. Their clips are still there. Their audiences can still watch them. In fact, rather more people will now watch them, because nothing improves a speaker’s pull quite like the suggestion that someone in government is frightened of what they might say. It gives them mystery, grievance and martyrdom, all wrapped up in a Home Office letter.

This is the uncomfortable bit. Banning hasn’t become entirely useless, but it has become much less useful at suppressing speech. It can still stop a person entering the country, attending a rally, meeting organisers, or creating a flashpoint in a particular place. That’s not nothing. But the internet has no borders, and ministers sometimes seem oddly slow to remember that.

It cannot stop the message travelling. It cannot stop the clips. It cannot stop the livestream. It cannot stop the instant conversion of a fairly niche event into a global grievance with a handy screenshot attached.

And if the person is genuinely objectionable, the problem doesn’t disappear. It may get worse. If they’re obscure, a ban can make them famous. If they’re already famous, it confirms their martyr narrative. If they’re extremist, it lets them say the system fears the truth. If they’re dishonest, it saves them from being challenged in public and lets them perform victimhood from a nice safe distance.

So the state may win the border-control point and lose the propaganda point. That’s quite a feat. Like stopping a man coming through the front door while broadcasting his speech through every window in the street.

Which is why this looks less like a thought-out strategy than a knee-jerk reaction by people staring into headlights. Something happens, someone shouts risk, someone invokes antisemitism, a minister sees an awkward headline coming, and the machinery lurches into motion. There may even have been coercion from somewhere else. We don’t know that, and shouldn’t pretend we do, but the speed and vagueness of the public explanation do rather invite the question. It has the feel of a decision made to stop a row, not a decision made after working out what would actually reduce harm.

There may, of course, be evidence the public hasn’t seen. If someone is inciting violence, glorifying terrorism, coordinating with a banned group, raising funds for violence, or deliberately stirring up hatred against Jews as Jews, then that’s a different matter. The state is entitled to protect the public, and antisemitism is real, serious and dangerous. Nobody sensible should shrug at it.

But the practical test cannot simply be: are they objectionable? Plenty of people are objectionable. Some of them have columns, peerages and lunch bookings. The real test should be: does their physical presence create a specific risk materially greater than their online presence?

If the answer is yes, exclusion may be justified. If someone is coming here to organise, recruit, intimidate, fundraise, or inflame a volatile situation on the ground, then physical presence matters. But if the problem is merely that they say controversial, offensive or inflammatory things online, banning them from Britain is often just state-sponsored publicity.

We also need to be precise about antisemitism. Criticism of Israel is not antisemitism. Criticism of Zionism is not automatically antisemitism. Criticism of Gaza policy, occupation, settlement, lobbying influence or the conduct of the Israeli state is not hatred of Jews. The line matters especially because some defenders of Israel too often blur it, treating criticism of a state as hostility to a people.

That doesn’t mean every pro-Palestinian commentator is wise, fair or careful. Some are plainly reckless. Some treat words like fireworks in a shed. But the test for exclusion cannot be that someone is abrasive, provocative, left-wing, anti-Israel, or makes ministers uncomfortable. If that becomes the test, we aren’t defending democracy. We’re just giving the Home Secretary a remote control for political inconvenience.

And what a precedent. Today it’s two American commentators accused of inflammatory views on Israel. Tomorrow it could be anti-immigration speakers, gender-critical feminists, Irish republicans, climate activists, Zionist hardliners, anti-Zionists, or anyone else whose presence might cause a minister to receive a difficult briefing before lunch.

This is the problem with vague powers. They always look sensible when they’re used against someone you dislike. They look rather less charming when the other lot get hold of the same lever.

So unless the Home Office has a much stronger case than it has made public, this looks censorious, brittle and self-defeating. It doesn’t protect debate. It infantilises it. It tells the public that the way to handle controversial arguments is not to expose them, challenge them, mock them, or beat them in open discussion, but to keep them out of the country and hope nobody notices.

Unfortunately, people did notice.

And now two commentators who were due to speak to relatively limited audiences in Britain have been handed international publicity, a ready-made free speech grievance, and a larger audience than they started with.

Somewhere in the Home Office, there’s probably a strategy document explaining why the chip-pan fire needed a leaf blower.

Men's Night Attire

There is something rather touching about traditional men's nightwear. Like military parade uniforms, it belongs to a category of male clothing that long ago escaped the realm of practicality and entered the world of ritual, symbolism and theatre. Nobody needs a bearskin hat to fight a war and nobody needs a paisley dressing gown to go to bed, yet both survive because men have always harboured a secret affection for costumes that make them feel slightly grander than reality warrants. 

 We effectively reached peak development sometime around 1893 and collectively decided there was no need to continue.

The entire category consists largely of tartan, paisley, velvet, piping and the faint implication that one may, at any moment, retire to a library to discuss the Boer War over a brandy.

A Victorian gentleman could apparently choose between paisley dressing gown, slightly different paisley dressing gown, or perhaps tartan if he was feeling dangerously continental.

What makes this even more gloriously British is that the whole thing was essentially an imperial collage assembled with complete confidence and very little self-awareness. Pyjamas themselves arrived from India, the word deriving from Hindi and Urdu. British colonial administrators discovered that loose cotton garments were rather more sensible in tropical heat than perspiring gently to death in European nightshirts, and promptly imported the idea home.

Paisley, meanwhile, came from Persian and Indian motifs encountered through empire and trade. The famous curved pattern became associated with the Scottish town of Paisley because its mills industrialised the design for mass consumption. Thus an ancient Asian pattern ended up wrapped around retired colonels in Tunbridge Wells complaining about railway timetables.

Tartan followed a different route. After the Jacobite rising of 1745, Highland culture was initially suppressed, only to be rebranded a century later into romantic imperial pageantry by people like Sir Walter Scott and embraced enthusiastically by Queen Victoria at Balmoral. What had once signified rebellion became reassuring establishment upholstery.

Then there was the polka dot variant. The final flourish in the taxonomy of traditional male nocturnal absurdity. Nothing says "serious Edwardian gentleman" quite like appearing at breakfast dressed as a melancholy casino table.

Polka dots occupied a curious middle ground between respectable domesticity, theatrical eccentricity, and retired barrister who keeps tropical fish. Unlike tartan, which implied rugged Highland virtue, or paisley, which hinted at imperial sophistication, polka dots suggested a man who owned a gramophone and perhaps laughed slightly too loudly at dinner parties.

So by the late Victorian period, the British gentleman's night attire had become an extraordinary cultural stew: Indian trousers, Persian motifs, Scottish weaving, Highland romanticism, polka dots, velvet lapels, and enough quilted fabric to reline a frigate.

And yet despite this vast imperial inheritance, men's nightwear still somehow managed to end up looking exactly like the lounge uniform of a mildly disappointed solicitor in Cheltenham.

Mind you, I never wear anything in bed anyway. My own brief flirtation with traditional night attire came at boarding school under the influence of British Kenyan cadets, where for a while I wore what everyone loosely called a "Kikuyu". In reality it was closer to a kikoi - a simple East African wrap that made infinitely more sense than swaddling oneself in enough velvet and tartan to upholster a minor stately home.

That, too, felt oddly imperial Britain. A handful of Kenyan pupils arrive at a boarding school and within months half the dormitory has adopted some fragment of East African clothing tradition with only the vaguest understanding of where it came from. The British talent for importing practical ideas from abroad, slightly misunderstanding them, and then institutionalising them as though Nelson himself had slept in one, is genuinely world class.

And in truth, once central heating arrived and British houses ceased trying to kill their occupants overnight, much traditional male nightwear became less necessity and more theatre. The smoking jacket survives because men secretly enjoy the idea that they may one day need to receive troubling news from a butler at midnight.

The reality is usually standing barefoot in the kitchen at 1am eating cheddar directly from the packet while illuminated by the fridge light like a failed minor aristocrat.

Meanwhile, women's nightwear evolved into an entire parallel civilisation. Silk, lace, satin, chiffon, embroidery, peignoirs, chemises, quilted robes, tea gowns, bias cuts, feather trims, sheer fabrics, floral prints, cinematic glamour, practical flannel, Parisian elegance, Hollywood seduction, cottagecore before anyone had invented the irritating word "cottagecore".

A man's traditional bedtime aspiration was essentially: "I hope to resemble a mildly prosperous duke with gout."

A woman's could range from "ethereal Pre-Raphaelite muse" to "1930s film star descending a staircase", or from "French aristocrat awaiting scandal" to "warm but threatening Welsh aunt in a quilted housecoat".

Even now, men's luxury nightwear still circles endlessly around the same exhausted formula: dark colours, monograms, velvet lapels and the sort of garments that make a retired dentist look as though he's about to explain imperial trade routes to a Labrador.

You occasionally see modern catalogues trying heroically to revive the genre. "Luxury men's loungewear" they call it now, because "dressing gown" no longer sounds aspirational enough. Yet beneath the marketing fog, it is still fundamentally a robe for standing in the kitchen at 11pm wondering whether another biscuit constitutes emotional collapse.

Women's nightwear, by contrast, still contains drama. Narrative. Delusion. Costume design. Entire emotional states stitched into fabric.

Men get: "I am indoors."

Women get: "I may be indoors, but I contain multitudes."

And frankly, looking at the average middle-aged man shambling about in an old T-shirt from a failed plumbing exhibition and a pair of collapsing elasticated shorts, perhaps civilisation made the correct call.

Paying Rent to the Oracle

Apologies for a very long read.

There is a rather bleak little joke forming here, although like most bleak little jokes these days it comes with a spreadsheet, a productivity curve and a management consultant nearby pretending he saw it coming.

For years we were told that Britain’s future was services. We did not need to make things, dig things, forge things, grow things, repair things or generate things with any particular urgency. No, we were going to be a clever country. We would advise, consult, regulate, finance, administrate, brand, strategise and, where necessary, hold a workshop about stakeholder alignment.

It was all very modern. We would leave the grubby business of actually producing things to other countries and concentrate on the high-value work. The sort of work done in glass buildings by people with laptops, lanyards and phrases like “circle back” lodged somewhere deep in the soul.

Then along comes AI. Not the old sort, which wrote faintly odd poems and occasionally told you that glue was a pizza topping. This is the new, more worrying sort: agentic AI. It does not just answer questions. It acts. It plans. It writes code, checks code, runs tests, updates files, drafts documents, processes information, books meetings, chases forms, compares options and quietly does half the work that was supposed to keep the services economy nicely upholstered.

And this is where Britain should probably stop looking smug. Because if your economy is built around moving information between boxes, and somebody invents a machine that moves information between boxes faster, cheaper and without needing a wellness webinar, you may have a problem.

There is something faintly theological about it too. AI lives in the cloud, which is already suspicious language. It seems to be everywhere and nowhere. It speaks in every language, answers almost any question, draws on more digitised human knowledge than any person could ever read, and can extrapolate beyond normal human capability in some fields.

It is not God, obviously. It is not wise, moral or omniscient. It is often wrong with the smooth confidence of a senior official explaining why the computer says no. But it is the first machine that gives ordinary people the feeling of consulting something close to an oracle. The old gods spoke in thunder. This one speaks in bullet points and occasionally asks you to upgrade your subscription.

That is the unsettling bit. AI does not merely retrieve what humans already know. In bounded domains, it can go beyond us. Protein folding, materials discovery, weather modelling, logistics, code, drug screening, plasma control. These are not just library problems. They are problems of scale, prediction and search. AI can move through those spaces faster than unaided human thought can follow.

But extrapolation is not wisdom. A machine may become superhuman at solving bounded problems long before it is remotely fit to decide which problems should be solved. It may find the molecule, optimise the system, write the code or produce the strategy, while still having no real grasp of consequence, responsibility or human mess. That is the theological danger. Not that we have built God, but that we have built something powerful enough to seem divine and stupid enough to still need checking.

Which is why the best use of AI may not be treating it as a single oracle at all. The next stage is already being worked on: systems of AIs set against one another, each with a role. One drafts. One criticises. One checks facts. One tests code. One looks for risks. One searches for alternatives. One tries to break the answer before a human ever sees it.

That is not science fiction. Anyone who has used two different AI systems as sparring partners will recognise the principle. A single model gives you an answer. A second model may spot what the first missed. Feed the criticism back, and the result often improves. Industrialise that loop, automate it, give it tools, connect it to data and workflows, and you no longer have a chatbot. You have a synthetic team.

No.1 Son, who actually understands this stuff rather than just prodding it with a stick as I do, started me on this particular line of research. He tells me this is already happening. The clever bit is not one AI giving one polished answer. The clever bit is multiple agents arguing, testing, correcting, building and checking one another at machine speed. It is my little ChatGPT-versus-Gemini parlour trick, but with a workflow diagram and people’s jobs attached. His own cheerful view is that when his job goes, he will either become a farmer or run a trading operation from his bedroom, which may be the most modern career plan I have heard: half medieval peasant, half hedge fund.

That changes the productivity argument. We are not merely talking about one worker with one clever assistant. We are talking about one worker supervising several artificial assistants, critics and testers, all operating continuously. The human role moves from producing the work to setting the objective, judging the outputs and taking responsibility for what survives the argument.

It also changes the risk. A single AI can be wrong. A group of AIs can still be wrong, but more persuasively, after having apparently checked itself. So the human in the loop becomes more important, not less. Someone still has to ask whether the answer is grounded in reality, whether the assumptions are sound, and whether the machine has simply produced a beautifully formatted mistake.

This is where policy has to begin, not end. The Government should not simply ask how Britain can “lead the world in AI”, which is the sort of phrase that should immediately make everyone check for missing wallets. It should ask who owns it, who powers it, who is displaced by it, who benefits from it, who audits it, who is liable when it goes wrong, and who is left outside pressing their nose against the glass while being told to retrain.

The jobs most exposed are not, at first, the traditional practical ones. The plumber still has to turn up. The electrician still has to know which wire is live. The farmer still has to deal with weather, soil, machinery and animals, none of which are especially impressed by a beta release. The builder still has to build the wall, although preferably not in the style of a national infrastructure project.

But we should not kid ourselves that physical work is automatically safe. Robots can weld. Machines can lay, cut, lift, sort, scan, spray, inspect and assemble. AI can design the joint, check the image, plan the route and optimise the process. The clean, repetitive, predictable parts of physical work are exposed too.

So the protected work is not simply “manual labour”. That is too crude, and it sounds like something said by someone who has never had to make anything fit. The valuable bit is skilled physical judgement in messy environments. It is the person who can deal with awkward access, damaged materials, one-off repairs, bad drawings, poor weather, odd noises, hidden corrosion, tired machinery and the small but important fact that reality refuses to behave like a training dataset.

Steel, water, soil, heat and animals do not care what the strategy document says. They do not care about vision statements, quarterly objectives or whether someone has used the word “transformation” in a meeting room with frosted glass. They just sit there being awkwardly real.

Which means technical education stops being a side issue. It becomes national policy. Apprenticeships, further education, adult retraining, engineering colleges and practical routes into skilled work should not be treated as the consolation prize for people who did not go to university. They are part of the country’s survival kit. If we need people who can install, repair, maintain, fabricate, build, care, farm and engineer in real conditions, then we need to fund and respect the institutions that produce them.

The vulnerable layer is the polite, educated, spreadsheet-and-email middle. The people who process, format, review, schedule, summarise, chase, compare, draft and produce internal documents that are read by seven people and understood by none. Junior analysis, routine legal work, compliance checking, customer service scripts, HR processes, report writing and “let me pull together a deck”.

AI loves that stuff. Not because it is wise, because it is not. But much of the modern services economy is not wisdom either. It is procedure, paperwork and pattern. It is applying rules to text and moving the result onwards. That is exactly where agentic AI becomes dangerous.

So government should map the exposed jobs properly, not with a cheerful press release about “opportunities” and a stock photograph of a woman smiling at a tablet. Administrators, clerks, call-centre workers, junior analysts, paralegals, coders, routine project managers, compliance staff and all the people whose work is mostly information-processing need to be visible in policy before the redundancy letters arrive. Wage insurance, transition support, retraining grants and regional employment plans sound dull. Dull is good. Dull is what you want before people start throwing furniture.

The programming world is already getting an early look at this. The people closest to the machinery can see what is coming. A good developer with agentic tools can produce multiples of his previous output, not because he has suddenly become a genius, but because the machine is now doing the dull implementation, testing, fixing, refactoring and boilerplate that used to fill the day.

This is the warning. When bright young programmers start saying their own job, as currently defined, may have a two-year shelf life, it is probably worth listening. They are not textile workers in 1980 being patronised by politicians with retraining leaflets. They are the people building the machines that are coming for the leaflets.

The corporate response will, of course, be magnificent. First, it will be banned. Then it will be quietly used by the people who get things done. Then management will wink at it. Then there will be a policy. Then there will be a taskforce. Then someone will produce a slide saying “AI-native transformation journey”, and everyone will pretend that this was the plan all along.

Even the bosses should not feel too smug. A great deal of management is not leadership in the Churchillian sense. It is moving information upwards, instructions downwards and blame sideways. Agentic AI can do quite a lot of that without needing a reserved parking space.

If an AI can track projects, summarise progress, flag risks, assign tasks, compare performance, draft reports and remind people what they promised last Thursday, then the question becomes rather awkward. What is the manager adding? In good cases, judgement, experience, coaching, accountability and the ability to resolve human mess. In bad cases, a calendar invitation and a tone of mild disappointment.

Senior executives are not magically protected either. Market analysis, competitor scanning, financial modelling, scenario planning and board-paper drafting are all AI-friendly work. The remaining human value is choosing between imperfect options, taking responsibility, understanding people, spotting what the model has missed, and having the courage to act when there is no spreadsheet-shaped certainty.

That is why governance matters. Multi-agent AI systems will draft, check, test, criticise and act. Some will be useful. Some will be wrong in ways that look reassuringly professional. Government needs rules on audit trails, accountability, safety, procurement, data protection, liability and human responsibility. “The AI said so” must never become an acceptable defence, especially in government, healthcare, policing, finance, welfare, employment or anything else where a tidy error can ruin someone’s life.

That may be the most amusing reversal. The people who spent years asking whether workers were “adding value” may soon find a machine asking the same question about them, only faster, cheaper and without laughing at the phrase “leadership journey”.

And then comes the awkward question. If much of the services middle is exposed, and only the skilled, messy, physical work is relatively protected, who runs the world?

It may become a struggle between those who control artificial cognition and those who still command physical competence. But the numbers matter. There will not be millions of people controlling frontier AI models, chip supply chains, data-centre networks and global platforms. That world will be narrow, capital-heavy and probably rather pleased with itself.

There will, however, be millions of people keeping the physical economy alive: installing, repairing, farming, building, wiring, plumbing, maintaining, nursing, fabricating, driving, inspecting and dealing with the endless awkwardness of matter.

That gives the physical side a different kind of power. Not the concentrated power of ownership, but the dispersed power of necessity. The AI controller can scale one system across millions of users. The electrician, farmer, technician or carer cannot be scaled in quite the same way, because the work is local, embodied and annoyingly real. The pipe bursts in one house. The roof leaks on one building. The field is wet in one valley. The old person needs care in one room. Reality is not a platform, however much someone in California may wish it were.

The cloud still needs a roof. The oracle still needs electricity. The model still needs cooling. The digital economy still needs copper, concrete, steel, water, land, food, grid connections, skilled hands and people who can fix things when reality declines to reboot.

This is where ownership policy becomes unavoidable. If a handful of companies own the models, chips, data centres, platforms and access rights, they will own the tollbooths of the new economy. Competition policy, data rights, public-interest AI infrastructure, sovereign capability and taxation of extraordinary AI rents are not dull technical details. They are the difference between a productive society and a rent-collecting machine with a chatbot interface.

This is not a romantic return to the village blacksmith. The future artisan may use drones, sensors, diagnostics, software, robotics and AI. But he still has to know what happens when theory meets mud, rust, heat, fatigue, weather, wear and a client who changed the requirement yesterday but forgot to mention it.

The danger is obvious. The people who control the AI may try to own everything and rent access to everyone else. The people who keep the physical world running may discover they are more numerous and more essential than they were told, but numbers only become power when they have bargaining strength, training, ownership and political voice.

And then there are the people left behind. Because there will be people left behind. Every technological revolution produces hymns to productivity from those close enough to the money, and small, soothing phrases about “transition” for those whose job has just evaporated.

The usual answer will be retraining, because it always is. Retraining is the comforting word used by people whose own job is not currently being retrained out of existence. Some of it will work. Plenty of people will learn to use AI, move into practical trades, maintain infrastructure, care for others, manage systems or build small businesses.

But not everyone can become an AI supervisor, nuclear engineer, heat-pump installer, nurse, farmer, electrician or artisan baker with a waiting list. A serious society has to admit that. Otherwise we end up pretending that a 54-year-old accounts clerk, a redundant junior solicitor, a call-centre worker and a middle manager with a laminated leadership certificate are all just one online course away from becoming robotics technicians.

This is where universal basic income starts to look less like a student union fantasy and more like a riot-prevention strategy. That sounds brutal, because it is. If AI and automation massively increase productivity while stripping income, status and bargaining power from millions, the question will not be whether we can afford redistribution. It will be whether we can afford the alternative.

UBI would not be charity. Nor would it be a reward for idleness, as the usual suspects would immediately honk from the cheap seats. It would be a claim on the common productivity of the system: the machines, models, energy networks, public research, infrastructure, law, education and accumulated human knowledge that made the wealth possible in the first place.

Of course UBI has problems. It costs money. It could be inflationary if badly designed. It does not give people purpose, status, community or pride. A monthly payment is not a civilisation. But a civilisation that allows a small priesthood to own the oracle, while millions are told to polish their CVs for jobs that no longer exist, may find that the monthly payment was the modest option.

The alternative is not necessarily quiet poverty. It may be political rage, social fracture, extremism, sabotage, riots, or eventually something worse. Hungry people are one problem. Humiliated people with time, education, grievance and a broadband connection are quite another.

So perhaps UBI, or a citizen’s dividend, or a negative income tax, or universal basic services, becomes less a utopian scheme and more a pressure valve. Not perfect. Not sufficient. But part of the price of keeping a high-automation society governable.

That is where politics should be paying attention. Not to another “world-leading AI strategy” with a foreword by someone photographed near a server rack, but to ownership, energy, technical education, infrastructure, planning, wages, apprenticeships, redistribution and who captures the gains.

Because if we get it wrong, the future will not be clever people freed for higher work. It will be a small priesthood controlling the oracle, a practical class holding the physical world together, and millions wondering why they are poorer in a world supposedly made more productive.

Which brings us to energy. AI needs data centres. Data centres need electricity. Electrification needs more electricity. EVs, heat pumps, industry, rail, batteries, cooling systems, factories and digital infrastructure all need reliable power. The fight over AI is therefore also a fight over energy. Whoever controls the intelligence layer will still depend on whoever controls the power layer.

Renewables are essential, but they do not abolish darkness, still air or winter evenings. Solar is lovely at lunchtime in June. Less so at tea time in January when every home is drawing power, every heat pump is working hard, and a data centre somewhere is helping a marketing assistant generate six alternative ways to say “delighted to announce”.

A serious country needs firm low-carbon power. Grid upgrades, storage, demand management, interconnection and nuclear are not optional extras. They are the physical basis of an AI-heavy, electrified economy. Nuclear is not glamorous. It is slow, expensive, over-regulated and politically painful. In Britain we seem able to turn it into a twenty-year saga, spend twice the budget and then act surprised that France, China and Korea know how to pour concrete.

But if the digital economy is going to expand, nuclear stops being an ideological hobby and becomes plumbing. Boring, vital, heavy, difficult plumbing.

And that is the irony. The more ethereal the economy becomes, the more it depends on very unethereal things: copper, concrete, uranium, pylons, cooling water, skilled engineers, fabricators, land, planning consent and people who can actually fix something when it breaks.

For decades, we nudged the clever children towards screens and told the practical ones not to worry, there would always be something for them. Now the screen has learned to do screen work, and the practical world is looking rather less second-class.

The safe future may not be “learn to code”, because the machine has learned to code. The safe future may be to learn to use AI, understand systems, know where the energy comes from, and have at least one skill that involves judgement in the real world rather than just fluency in the digital one.

And even with AI, the safe approach may not be one machine giving one answer. It may be several machines disagreeing while a human with some judgement sits in the middle, listening, prodding, checking and occasionally asking whether everyone has gone mad.

Which is a slightly awkward conclusion for a country that sold off half its industrial base, neglected technical education, made housing unaffordable, tangled infrastructure in planning treacle, and then proudly announced that its future was services.

The required policy is not mysterious. Own some capability. Tax some rents. Build the grid. Build firm low-carbon power. Fund technical education. Protect displaced workers. Share productivity gains. Regulate high-risk AI properly. Keep humans accountable. Stop pretending that innovation policy is a glossy brochure with a launch event and some lanyards.

We have built something that looks a bit like an oracle, runs on electricity, feeds on human knowledge, predicts beyond human reach, and still cannot be trusted to know when it is talking rubbish.

The question is not whether Britain can write another strategy about it. Of course it can. Britain can write a strategy about a kettle.

The question is whether we still know how to build, power, own and govern the real machinery underneath the miracle, and whether we have the wit to share the gains before the people left outside decide to stop asking politely.

Otherwise we may find ourselves living in the cloud, paying rent to the oracle, and waiting for someone practical to come round and fix the lights.