Putin’s war machine is built on two things – brute force and outright fraud. When he tried to take Ukraine with brute force in 2022, it fell apart in spectacular fashion. But back in 2014, when he nicked Crimea, he did it the KGB way – deception, subversion and enough political theatre to make it look legitimate. If the full-scale invasion of Ukraine has been a masterclass in Russian incompetence, the annexation of Crimea was a masterclass in how to steal territory without firing a shot.
Russia didn't invade Crimea in the traditional sense. It absorbed it. First, it flooded the peninsula with spetsnaz, unmarked troops and undercover FSB operatives, then it rolled out the propaganda machine, convinced the local pro-Russian population they were in danger, and finally staged a referendum that was about as legitimate as a three-quid Rolex. By the time the world caught on, Russia had already changed the locks and put up curtains.
Sun Tzu would have given a nod of approval to the deception. Putin disguised his intentions, disguised his troops and disguised the annexation as a democratic choice. The key to it all was plausible deniability. The "little green men" weren’t Russian soldiers, apparently. The referendum was the "will of the people." Ukraine was "unable to govern Crimea properly" and the Russian-speaking population needed "protection." The whole thing was textbook "maskirovka", straight from the Soviet playbook.
Maskirovka – the Russian doctrine of military deception – has its roots in Tsarist Russia but was fully developed and institutionalised under the Soviet Union. The term itself means “disguise” or “camouflage”, but in practice, it covers a wide range of deception tactics, including false information, feints, decoys, psychological operations, and operational secrecy.
And it worked. The Ukrainian military, caught off guard, was paralysed. The West, still trying to believe Russia was a "rational actor", responded with diplomatic hand-wringing and weak sanctions. Putin had calculated, correctly, that the EU was too reliant on Russian gas and the US had no appetite for direct confrontation. Crimea was taken without a proper fight, and Russia was left with the impression that this kind of covert land grab was the future of warfare.
Which is exactly why Putin thought he could get away with the same trick in 2022. He sent in infiltrators, tried to prop up fake "pro-Russian" movements in Kharkiv and Zaporizhzhia, and expected Ukraine to fold like a deck of cards. But this time, Ukraine wasn’t playing along. The lessons of Crimea had been learned. The infiltration was countered, the collaborators were rounded up, and instead of a swift, bloodless takeover, Russia found itself bogged down in a real war – one that has exposed its military as a bloated, corrupt embarrassment.
Ukraine has since used Sun Tzu’s principles better than Russia ever could. Instead of playing defence, it has taken the war to Russian logistics, leadership and morale. Instead of engaging in costly urban warfare, it has drawn Russian forces into meat grinders like Bakhmut, forcing them to throw away men and equipment for minimal gains. Instead of letting Putin dictate the pace, Ukraine has launched blistering counteroffensives, striking where Russia is weakest. Every drone attack on Moscow, every hit on the Black Sea Fleet, every rail sabotage deep in Russian-occupied territory is part of the same strategy – keep the enemy unbalanced, stretched thin and doubting itself.
For all its grandstanding, the Russian military has shown that it can only win when no one is fighting back. Crimea was a coup, not a war. The moment it faced a real one, all its advantages vanished. Putin thought he could keep expanding Russia’s borders the way he took Crimea – quickly, quietly and without consequence. Instead, he has walked straight into a war of attrition he cannot afford.
Crimea was the high point of Russian hybrid warfare. Ukraine has made sure there won’t be another one.
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