There is a basic difference between Europe and America right now, and it is not GDP, or defence spending, or who can shout “freedom” loudest while quietly checking their share portfolio.
It is legitimacy. Public consent. The boring stuff political philosophers bang on about, because it turns out to matter.
If Trump slaps tariffs on Europe because Denmark refuses to hand over Greenland like its a spare set of keys, plenty of Europeans will not see that as “tough negotiating”. They will see it as bullying. And when people feel bullied, they are far more likely to back retaliation even if it costs them. Not because anyone enjoys paying more for imports, but because the principle is obvious. If you let a big power push you around once, it becomes a habit.
This is where Locke and Rousseau still matter. Governments can impose costs on the public only when the public believes the policy is legitimate and justified. Weber makes the same point in a more modern form: authority holds when coercion is accepted as legitimate. Tariffs are coercion. They are politically sustainable when voters accept the reason for them.
So European retaliation is easier to hold together politically because it can be framed as self defence. Not chest beating, not grandstanding, just refusing to be pressured. That sort of thing tends to travel well with the public, especially when the alternative is looking weak. That's not to say EU counter tariffs are a good thing - they're not.
In America, it lands differently. Tariffs on Europe will be sold as “winning” and “putting America first”, but for most people it will show up as higher prices and more hassle in the things they actually buy and build with. Car parts, machinery, building materials, components, anything with a European supply chain behind it. Tariffs are not paid by foreigners in some magical way. They are paid by American importers, and then the cost spreads through the economy like a tax that nobody voted for.
And here’s the part that turns it into an own goal. If you make European goods more expensive, American buyers do not automatically “buy American”. Importers do not buy flags. They buy price and reliability. In some categories, that means switching to non-European suppliers, and that can include China, even with existing tariffs. China has stayed quiet on Greenland and will happily take whatever business falls off the back of a Western argument. It does not need to threaten anyone. It just needs to be available.
So Trump’s Greenland tariffs could easily become a policy that punishes Europe, irritates American consumers, and hands China extra market share. That is not “standing up to China”. That is helping China by accident.
Now bring it back home, because this is where it gets awkward for the UK.
Starmer has been trying to rebuild Britain’s credibility by doing something unfashionable: treating allies like allies. If Trump starts swinging tariffs at Europe over Greenland, Starmer looks more right than dull. He looks like the one who understands that sometimes “hard choices” are real, not a slogan. Standing by allies when it is inconvenient is one of them, because the alternative is being picked off one by one.
Farage, meanwhile, is treading a very narrow path. His entire brand is “sovereignty” and “Britain first”, but he has also tied himself to Trump, who treats other countries’ sovereignty as negotiable and allies as customers. Those two positions only coexist if you never ask awkward questions.
And when the Greenland tariffs story broke, Farage’s response was telling. He distanced himself and said the tariffs would hurt the UK. Fair enough. But he still avoided the bigger point, which is that this is not normal trade policy. It is pressure being applied to Europe for refusing to hand over territory. If your politics is built on sovereignty, that should be the easiest issue in the world.
Because if Trump keeps punishing Europe for backing Denmark, Farage has three options and none of them are pretty. He can back Trump and look like a lapdog cheering on economic damage to Britain and its neighbours. He can criticise Trump properly and annoy the base he’s spent years cultivating by borrowing Trump’s politics. Or he can keep half-disagreeing while sidestepping the principle, which makes him look slippery because the issue is not abstract. It is jobs, prices, and allies being threatened.
Oddly, this is also Kemi Badenoch’s chance to stop the drain to Reform. She has criticised Trump’s Greenland tariff threats, and she has also argued against retaliatory tariffs on the grounds that they make everyone poorer. That is a coherent position, and it is one she can use to look tougher than Farage without copying his Trump obsession. She can say: we will defend our allies, we will defend British interests, and we will not pretend trade wars are good for living standards. If she cannot make that case, then the Tory collapse really is terminal.
And it is worth saying out loud: this is exactly what Brexit bought us. Less influence, less shelter, and front-row seats to other people’s trade wars. We cannot shape Europe’s response from the inside any more, but we can still be hit by the fallout, because geography does not care about slogans.
So yes, this sort of Trump-led tariff bullying would probably strengthen Starmer and undermine Farage. It makes competence and alliances look like common sense again. And it leaves Farage where he always ends up when reality turns up: trying to keep the applause while the rest of us pay the bill.
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