Blu Tack Neutrality

There is something faintly absurd about a university that prides itself on fearless enquiry deciding that the path to harmony runs through the Blu Tack drawer.

At Queen Mary University of London, anonymous complaints from Jewish students about posters reading “Free Palestine” and “Stop the Genocide” led to a direction that staff remove political posters from offices.

No concrete antisemitic wording has been publicly identified.

An Israeli professor criticised the move and stated she has never felt threatened on campus.

A Palestinian voice did the same.

The institutional answer was not a content finding. It was a blanket policy.

The justification reportedly leaned on the idea that the university does not permit “permanent displays”. But posters are not permanent. They are bits of paper. They come down in seconds. They are not chiselled above the entrance or issued as an official communique. Calling them “permanent” feels less like description and more like rhetorical cushioning.

If the concern was harassment under equality law, then say so and specify the language that crossed the line. UK law does not treat subjective offence alone as harassment. It requires conduct that objectively creates a hostile or intimidating environment. That demands evidence. A bare allegation, however sincerely felt, is not the same as a demonstrated breach.

There is also a wider political context that cannot be ignored. The Israeli government has, for years, pushed an argument that certain forms of anti Zionism or harsh criticism of Israeli state policy amount to antisemitism. That position shows up in the IHRA working definition debate and in diplomatic lobbying internationally. One can acknowledge that antisemitism is real and rising while also recognising that governments have an interest in broadening definitions in ways that shield themselves from political scrutiny.

Universities, understandably nervous of being accused of tolerating antisemitism, can end up absorbing that framing. The risk is that political condemnation of a government’s conduct becomes institutionally conflated with hostility towards Jewish people as Jews. That is precisely the distinction equality law requires them to keep clear.

Anonymous complaints deserve to be taken seriously. Students should not have to risk social reprisal to raise concerns. But anonymity increases the need for transparent reasoning. If no one can identify what was antisemitic, the public justification becomes thin.

The university’s move also invites the consistency test. Would the same circular have gone out for “Stop the Bombing of Ukraine”? There are Russian students on campus. They are not responsible for the Kremlin. A poster condemning state violence is political speech, not hostility towards nationals. If that distinction holds there, it must hold here.

Likewise, would “Save the NHS”, “Scrap Net Zero”, or a domestic party slogan have triggered a general ban on political posters? If not, then the rule is not about permanence. It is about volatility. It activates when reputational heat rises.

There is a category error lurking in the background. Judges must avoid public political advocacy because visible impartiality is the essence of their role. Doctors may refuse certain procedures on conscience grounds, but they cannot obstruct lawful care. Those offices carry strict neutrality constraints. Universities are different. They exist to host structured disagreement, not to remove it from view when it becomes awkward.

The key line that should have been drawn is simple: criticism of a government is permitted; hostility towards individuals on grounds of ethnicity or religion is not. That is legally defensible and intellectually honest. Replacing that analysis with “no political posters” sidesteps the hard work of judgment.

When both a Palestinian voice and an Israeli professor say the response is misplaced, it suggests the issue was not campus threat but institutional anxiety.

The posters may have come down. The deeper question remains whether the university has confused the management of controversy with the management of discrimination.